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2EFFICIENT MODAL SPLIT 
1. Background and purpose 
A lot is said at this conference about ways and means of improving the cost-efficiency of 
public transport. Two main possibilities for improvement are to stimulate competition, and to 
enhance the motivation and creativity of operators by introducing the profit motive into a 
traditional “public service”.  
The question is, if the present allocative inefficiency in transport markets will also be 
improved in the process? This paper is meant to serve as a counterbalance to the main 
preoccupation of the conference, by looking at the present allocation of total travel between in 
the first place individual car and public transport services, and identifying the main reform 
potential for beneficial changes of the modal split. And it is argued that these changes will not 
be brought about by the increased reliance on market forces. On the contrary, better planning 
of public transport systems, and, I dare say, continued or increased subsidization are two 
necessary conditions for realizing the potential improvement of the resource allocation. A 
complementary, significant point is, however, that there is no inevitable conflict between the 
ambition to increase cost-efficiency in public transport, and a transport policy towards an 
efficient modal split. The paper ends by pointing out a fruitful, strategic new area of research: 
how to design a system of subsidization of decreasing-cost public transport, which makes 
profit maximization on the part of the operators and social surplus maximization coincide? 
32. Modal split and basic characteristics of public and 
individual transport 
In this introductionary section the salient features of the present modal split in passenger 
transport is held up, and the cost characteristics of, on one hand, scheduled public transport 
(SPT), and, on the other, individual car transport, which are the main explanatory factors for 
the observed great differences in the modal split on different routes. 
2.1 Present m odal split by distance and by volum e 
In a country like Sweden car transport is dominant, but there are important niches for other 
modes of transport at either end of the spectrum of trip distances. For long-distance transport 
speed is obviously the main quality of service that makes a difference, which can break the 
dominance of car transport.  
But speed has typically a price in terms of ready access to the transport facility. Airports and 
high-speed railways should not be too close to where people live, or spend their leisure time. 
Therefore the feeder transports (by another mode of transport) are relatively long for the fast 
modes, which means that a natural division of the non-urban transport markets by distance 
has come about. For personal transport this is illustrated in fig 1, where the model split of 
personal transport longer than 10 km in Sweden is depicted. Road transport is completely 
dominating in the distance range between 10 and 100 km. For longer distances the railway 
transport share is steadily growing with distance. Around 300 km, air transport starts to make 
an impact. For very long distances, in the region of 1000 km, air transport is market leader 
both for travel time reasons and geographical necessity.  
Figure 1  The modal split of personal transport by distance 
W ith the introduction of high-speed trains (after the diagram was originally drawn), rail 
transport seems to make inroads in the long-distance markets for especially business travel, 
where air transport has been dominating. 
4Besides the technical division of the transport sector by mode, i.e. by the bearer of transport 
vehicles, a complementary economic outlook, focusing on the organizational form of 
transport production, shed further light on the competitive conditions in the transport sector, 
and, in particular, urban transport which is not covered by the diagram of figure 1.
 The three main forms of organizing transport are (1) to use your own vehicle, (2) to hire 
a (whole) transport vehicles and (3) to buy a share of the space of a vehicle in scheduled 
public transport (SPT) service. The most significant front line, as far as competition is 
concerned, is between do-it-yourself car transport and SPT by road, rail and air. 
For distances where the SPT share is as low as around 20%, which is the case in a wide 
middle-distance range, it can be concluded that mainly so called "captive riders" are using the 
SPT alternatives to private car travel. As long as there is an appreciable number of travellers 
without a car at their disposal, railway and/or bus transport services are viable, but the 
generalized cost (GC) of car travel is definitely lower, which is very obvious when the 
travellers make up of group of at least two persons per car. 
For short-distance urban travel commuter train services can be very competitive both on 
account of their own strengths, and of weaknesses of its rival: trains are faster, and less 
expensive than the private car for commuters with monthly passes, by which the average 
monetary cost per trip is typically below 1 euro, irrespective of distance, and the marginal 
monetary cost is zero. The general competitiveness of short-distance urban rail transport is 
maintained by considerable subsidies (by local taxpayers) to operators of commuter train 
services. However, in case the car travel alternative would involve the payment of a parking 
charge adjusted to the conditions of the market in the central city, that alternative would be 
inferior in terms of generalized costs at almost any distance, also without subsidization of 
public transport. 
In table 1 below the car share in the total travel by motor vehicles is given for different 
segments of the total transport market of Stockholm. As seen the car share range from 28%  
for commuting between the inner suburbs and the central city in the rush hours to 72% for 
travel between the outer suburbs. The latter value is definitely a corner solution, i.e. it is 
determined by the rate of car ownership and car disposal rather than the relative GC for 
alternative modes of transport. 
Table 1 Car share of total motorized trips by road and rail in Stockholm 
MARKET SEGMENT Time period Percentage 
Travel within central city All day 50% 
Inner suburbs to central city Rush hours 28% 
Outer suburbs to central city       “ 31% 
Inner suburbs to inner suburbs All day 52% 
Outer suburbs to outer suburbs      “ 72% 
In urban areas it is the volume of travel rather than the travel distance, which is the main 
modal split determinant. It is common to consider the relationship between the generalized 
cost and route volume, but a wider perspective is obtained by relating GC to the density of 
transport demand of an area, as will be demonstrated presently. 
The point is that an urban car transport system has a much lower capacity than a public 
transport system. This means that urban car transport is eventually an increasing-cost activity, 
while an urban public transport system is a decreasing-cost activity almost indefinitely. This 
5is the main explanation for the wide variations in the modal split of different urban transport 
market segments exemplified in table 1 above.   
2.2 Economies of density of demand for scheduled public transport 
Given the transport infrastructure for a particular SPT system, the following two cost relations-
hips give rise to marked traffic volume economies in SPT-service production. 
1) The SPT-service producer cost per passenger (or freight ton) is steeply falling with                           
       vehicle size. The main reason for this is that the driver, or crew cost per vehicle is either                 
       constant, or is increasing markedly degressively with vehicle size, and in the second place  
       the vehicle capital and running costs per passenger (or freight ton) kilometer is decreasing  
       with increases in vehicle size. 
2)   The SPT-service user cost per trip (in the case of passenger transport) is falling with vehicle 
number: the more vehicles there are in the SPT system, the less waiting time and/or access 
time (walking time in local transport) are required per trip. 
The "Mohring effect" has, in principle, both a time and space dimension. Therefore it is 
instructive to consider a system, or network of SPT-services, and not just a line. The best, simple 
illustration of what it is all about is the Circletown model. (Jansson, 1997) 
Figure 2 Buses and bus lines in Circletown for three different levels of the density of de-
mand 
The economies of density of demand takes a number of expressions: 
-  more bus lines means less access time 
- when bus lines are denser, each line can be straighter to save travel time 
-  more buses on each line means less waiting-time at bus stops 
- buses should be successively bigger as the density of demand is increasing, which will 
reduce the bus operator's cost per trip. 
- bigger buses can have a higher rate of occupancy with impunity as to queuing time for 
passengers. 
A numerical example of the decreasing cost character of urban bus transport is calculated by the 
Circletown model (Jansson 1997). Comparing the top and bottom rows in table, it is seen that as 
the density of demand is increasing from a very low level (100) to a high level (15.000), 
obtainable when the majority of all trips longer than "walking distance" are made by bus, the 
total producer and user cost per trip goes down to a third of the initial level. The frequency of 
service goes up from one bus every twentieth minute to one bus every fourth minute, and the line 
density is also multiplied by five. It is notable that ACprod falls as much as ACuser. This is mainly 
(1)  four small buses (2) Sixteen mediumsize 
buses
(3) Sixty-four big buses
6achieved by increasing the bus size. A minibus of a maximum of 20 passengers is optimal in a 
situation with extremely low density of demand, and large buses taking more than one hundred 
passengers is optimal in the opposite extreme case. 
Table 2  Optimal design and generalized costs of bus transport in Circletown at different 
levels of demand 
DENSITY 
OF
DEMAND: 
OPTIMAL DESIGN OF BUS  
SERVICES 
AVERAGE TRIP COST, Euro 
Number of 
trips gene-
rated per 
km2 and 
day 
Bus size:
number of 
seats 
Frequency:
buses per 
hour 
Average
walking 
distance 
to/from 
stops 
(meter) 
Producer 
cost
including 
externality 
charges of 
4 km  bus 
trip, ACprod
User cost of 
walking to/-
from bus 
stops, wai-
ting, and 
riding 4 km 
by bus,  
ACuser
Total cost 
of 4 km 
bus trip, 
AC
100 
250 
500 
750 
1 000 
2 000 
4 000 
8 000 
15 000 
20
27
34
39
43
54
68
86
105
3
4
5
6
6
8
10  
12  
15  
350
260
210
180
160
130
100
80 
60 
1.57 
1.20 
0.98 
0.88 
0.81 
0.68 
0.57 
0.49 
0.43 
3.62 
2.88 
2.45 
2.24 
2.11 
1.84 
1.62 
1.45 
1.33 
5.19
4.08
3.43
3.12
2.92
2.52
2.19
1.94
1.76
Source: Jansson, 1997 
It is worth emphasizing again that the Mohring effect, i.e. the economies of number in the 
user costs are not enough to give rise to the markedly decreasing costs. Economies of vehicle 
size in the producer costs is another necessary condition, because without these economies it 
would be possible to nullify the Mohring effect by employing very small buses in such a large 
number that walking and waiting time would become trivial.  
2.3 Diseconomies of density of demand for urban car transport 
Car transport in a given urban road network will sooner or later show decreasing returns. In 
many urban relations the potential demand is low enough for making it possible to carry out 
all the trips demanded by car, if everyone had a car at his/her disposal: car cost with respect to 
the route volume is constant for all practical purposes. On the main routes into the central 
city, on the other hand, only a fraction of the total travel demand could be carried out by 
individual car transport. The limited capacity will be manifest by a steeply rising GCcar well 
before all demand is met. On the assumption that total demand along a particular route is (by 
and large) given, the GCcar function represents the demand for the alternative mode of 
transport, say bus, on the route concerned. 
In the three diagrams of figure 3, the values of the generalized cost of bus trips in Circletown 
in table 2 are the basis for the falling GCbus curves. In diagram (a), where the trip volume is 
measured in thousands, the whole range of values in table 2 is represented: the total travel 
goes from 0 to 30.000 trips per km
2
 and day. In diagram (b) where the trip volume is 
7measured in hundreds, the end point of the GCbus curve is thus at a level of trip volume of 
3000, and in diagram (c) where the trip volume is measured in tens, the end point is at a level 
of trip volume of 300. 
Figure 3  Modal split and density of transport demand 
The curves for GCcar with respect to trip volume are going in the wrong direction, from right 
to left in the diagrams. In diagram (a) GCcar is steeply rising, because the road capacity is 
insufficient to accommodate a car trip volume above 15 000 trips per km
2
 and day. Diagrams 
(b) and (c) represent urban areas of much sparser population, where it would be physically 
possible to make all trips by car. As long as the parking is free or cheap, GCcar will be below 
GCbus in the whole trip volume range represented by diagrams (b) and (c), and the modal split 
is simply determined by car disposal as a “corner solution”. 
One important market segment is not represented among the three diagrams above: the 
commuter traffic between the suburbs and the central city. Commuter traffic by car to the 
central city is high in absolute terms, but low relative to the public transport volume. The 
equilibrium mechanism is more complicated than is indicated by diagram (a) of figure X 
above, because there are two capacity limitations which each can be the most telling one for 
different categories of car commuters: the capacity of the “entrances” to the central city 
(rather than the roads as such between the suburbs and the central city), and the parking space 
in the central city. For commuters spending 8 hours at their place of work, the real cost of the 
parking space for a car used just for the work trip can be of the same order of magnitude in 
big cities as the capital cost of the car itself. 
2.4 The reform potential 
Allocative inefficiency in the sense that price is more or less different from the price-relevant 
marginal cost abound in the transport sector. This is true about individual car transport as well 
as public transport. This does not mean, however, that a very inefficient modal split is 
omnipresent.  In the wide middle-distance market segment price adjustments to fulfil strict 
efficiency conditions would have only a small effect on the modal split. 
The main potential for policy changes that would make a difference as regards allocative 
efficiency is to be found at both ends of the “spectrum” of figure 1, where the distribution of 
8trips between individual car transport and various modes of scheduled public transport (SPT) 
is already relatively even. 
The even split is a sign that an “interior solution” applies, where GCcar | GCSPT, rather than a 
corner solution where GCcar « GCSPT.
In what follows three market segments are discussed more in detail, where the potential seems 
high for substantial increases in the SPT share with consequent welfare gains. 
1) Travel in the central city all day 
2) Urban commuter transport 
3) Interurban railway passenger transport 
93. From car to bus in the central city 
Of the three market segments pointed out above, travel within the central city differs from the 
other two trip markets in so far that peakiness of demand is a minor problem. In chapters 4 
and 5 peak-load pricing is the main policy measure discussed. Here a combination of pricing 
policy and regulation of street space is the key to the goal of social surplus maximization. 
The traffic structure in the central city during the work-day is markedly different from the 
rush hour traffic between the suburbs and the central city. The latter is now the main task for 
the public transport. Outside rush hours the level of demand is much lower for the public 
transport system, which is a main reason for its financial problems. The total demand for 
travel in central city during office hours, on the other hand, is fairly evenly spread over the 
day. This is well recorded as regards car traffic. The time-profile for the car traffic in the 
central city has lately become rather flat from early morning to late afternoon, which is 
illustrated in figure 4 below. This is partly explained by peak traffic spreading into the time 
period between the morning and afternoon peaks, and partly by the fact that the commercial 
traffic has its peak during the workday rather than before and after. In “Trafiken i Regionplan 
2000” it is established that the share of taxis, LDVs, service vehicles, and cars for business 
trips is very high in the central city road traffic during office hours, up to 50%. 
Source: Transek (2000) 
Figure 4 Hourly time-profile of main road traffic flow in the central city of 
Stockholm on an autumn day of eight different years (1991-1997) 
Personal transport involving the carriage of heavy tools or bulky parcels, etc, are “captive” car 
traffic, but there is a potential for bus traffic in the central city to win over other kinds of 
business trips as well as most private travel. If proper road pricing is introduced, this would, 
of course, help a lot. An even more important step to take in the market for car travel is to 
tighten up the parking policy. A car trip within the central city requires two different parking 
spaces: one may be the “base” for the car, so to speak, at the owner’s place of work or 
residence. This would often belong to the “reserved” parking market segment. The other 
parking place, however, would normally have to be in the open market segment, in the street, 
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or in a commercial parking lot (outside, or inside a multi-storey car park). If the commercial 
level of parking prices could be ruling everywhere, an incentive at least as strong as proper 
road pricing to discourage car use in the central city would exist. 
For the public transport system serving the central city, the Circletown model above indicates 
the potential for lowering GCbus towards the level of GCcar, provided that (1) the goal of social 
surplus maximization is adopted, and (2) that in case proper road pricing is lacking the buses 
have their own exclusive lanes, because if the buses and cars are crowding together, it is the 
former which are the main losers. 
A necessary condition for social surplus maximization is that the bus fare is set equal to the 
price-relevant marginal cost. The theory of optimal pricing of scheduled passenger transport is 
outlined in the next two sections. First come a more general discussion, and then the specific 
case of urban bus services is addressed. 
3.1 General theory of the price-relevant marginal cost of scheduled 
public transport 
The basic formula for the price-relevant marginal cost of SPT-services is written like this: 
dB
dAC
B+MC=MC
user
prod  (1) 
The number of trips by the public transport system concerned, is denoted B. The external 
marginal cost appears as charges on the vehicles payable by the public transport company. In 
case the public transport vehicles are buses in an urban road network, they should pay conges-
tion tolls and externality charges just as cars and other motor vehicles for the costs they cause 
by making use of  road space. These charges are part of MCprod in (1), and will consequently 
be passed on to the public transport passengers included in the fares. 
Although the two pioneering classics in the field of SPT pricing principles – Mohring (1972), 
and Turvey and Mohring (1975) – were couched in what the authors chose to call short-run 
marignal cost (SRMC) pricing terms, it is here argued that in order to gain substantial 
additional insight, one should make a departure from the road staked out in those classic 
works, by regarding the number of transport vehicles as variable in the costing and pricing 
analysis. Whether or not this is a departure from the golden SRMC-pricing rule is a matter of 
semantics, which we shall not go into here. The important point is anyway that, no matter 
which design variable, or which combination of design variables are adjusted to meet an 
increase in demand, the price-relevant marginal cost should come out the same. (Jansson, 
1984) 
The two price-relevant cost components of (1) above will take quite different values depen-
ding on in which way additional passengers are taken on. However, in optimum the sum of 
the two components is the same irrespective of how capacity is augmented. The symbolic 
production function below can be used as a basis for discussing this central aspect. 
B = f (N, S, V, H, I)  (2) 
B =  number of trips  
N =  number of equisized SPT-vehicles 
S =  vehicle size in terms of holding capacity (i.e. the maximum number of passengers) 
11
V =  speed 
H =  handling capacity, i.e. the number of passengers boarding and/or alighting per unit of 
time 
I = occupancy rate (= holding capacity utilization) 
The expansion path is defined by such combinations of the design variables in (2) which 
minimize the total cost TCprod + TCuser for every level of output, B. Along the expansion 
path the price-relevant cost, MC is independent of which (single) design variable, or 
combination of design variables are changed when calculating this cost. The relative order of 
magnitude of its two components can, however, be very different, which should be carefully 
noted, in view of the fact that only one of them is a producer marginal cost. Let us illustrate 
this point by some examples: 
(1) Additional passengers ('B) can normally be accomodated (almost) without any additio-
nal producer inputs, simply by increasing the occupancy rate, ). However, in particular 
in peak periods this cannot be done with impunity as regards the user costs. Hence MC 
will in this case solely consist of an occasionally high user cost component, repre-
senting quening and/or crowding costs of the passengers. 
(2) Another, more regular way of accomodating additional passengers is to increase the 
number of vehicles (N). In this case the MCprod component will be fairly substantial, 
while the user cost component becomes negative due to general economies of vehicle 
number in the user costs. 
(3) A third possibility is to increase the size (S) of vehicles in order to take on more 
passengers or freight. This would leave the user cost component in the price-relevant 
cost by and large unchanged, and only MCprod contributes to MC. 
3.2 Applications to urban bus services 
In the case of urban bus transport the number of vehicles is the most practical factor to 
increase. Together with the old marginal cost proxy "the average cost of the marginal plant" a 
simple, and yet robust MC-expression is obtained, at least for an urban bus transport system 
containing a good number of vehicles. The two terms of (1) above can consequently be 
specified like this in the case of urban bus services: 
B
tvB
-
B
C
=MC '
'
'
'
 (3) 
'C =  incremental cost of the bus company for putting in another bus in operation 
B = existing number of passengers 
'B =  number of new passengers carried by the additional bus 
't = waiting-time saving per trip by existing passenger 
v = value of one minute waiting-time saving 
The price-relevant cost and the optimal fare should be differentiated in the first place between 
peak and off-peak periods. However, as was pointed out before, in the central city trip market, 
this feature is not very prominent, so this exercise will wait till later (section 5) where public 
transport for commuters is discussed.  
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As seen in (3), the first term in the two-term expression for MC is a proxy for MCprod, which 
would be fairly close to the average cost of the bus operator, ACprod. In addition the 
"Mohring effect" has to be taken into account. The second term of (3) representing the 
Mohring effect is a negative cost, i.e. a benefit, which makes the optimal fare level fall well 
below ACprod. In section 2 the results of the Circletown bus service optimization model were 
presented. In this model it was found that along the expansion path, which inter alia implies 
that bus size is optimally adjusted to different levels of the density of demand, MC is roughly 
constant. Since ACprod is steadily falling along the expansion path, the financial result of 
optimal pricing is that total cost recovery is very low for low demand densities, and grows 
successively to a maximum of about 50% for a very high demand density. 
The principal problem of optimal bus transport pricing has to do with vehicle size rigidity. If 
an existing bus fleet consists of buses of markedly inoptimal sizes, it can be difficult to make 
the right adjustments quickly, and the application of formula (3) may give some odd results 
like negative fares.  
Another complication not mentioned so far is the fact that passengers put two different 
demands on transport vehicle capacity – demand for space in the vehicle (a seat), and demand 
for vehicle time during the act of boarding and alighting. In principle, the optimal fare has two 
components: 
 (1) the space occupancy charge 
 (2) the boarding/alighting charge, 
of which the latter is normally the least important, but computationally the most complicated 
item.  
3.3 Separate track for buses 
The ideal situation to aim at in the central city travel market is something like that illustrated 
in the left-hand diagram of figure 3 in section 2: an equilibrium solution where GCbus | GCcar.
If such a position is obtained, and in addition the part of each GC made up of the monetary 
price is equal to the price-relevant cots, it would be perfect. The opposite, worst case is 
illustrated below, which unfortunately prevails in many cities in reality. Buses and cars are 
crowding together in the streets in the absense of any form of reasonable road pricing. The 
situation is bad for both, but the buses come out worst, because they are relatively large and 
clumsy, and have to move in and out of the slow-moving traffic to let out and pick up 
passengers at stops. Under these circumstances GCcar is all the time well below GCbus: only 
those without a car at their disposal take the bus. 
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Figure 5  Cars and buses are crowding together 
In the absense of proper road pricing, which could eliminate the congestion, a second-best 
solution is to provide separate track for the buses. This would take away a substantial amount 
of the precious road space for the cars, but it is in line with the first-best solution, where 
substantially more buses would run, and a good part of the present car traffic would be gone. 
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4. Peak-load pricing of scheduled public transport: purpose 
and potential 
Apart from travel in the central city, the transport market segments where SPT is most 
important are characterized by big demand peaking problems both in time and space. The 
basic idea of peak-load pricing is to level out the peaks and troughs in the demand profile in 
each particular market in order to save capacity costs, and raise the rate of capacity utilization 
in off-peak periods. To an economist the rationality of peak-load pricing is self-explanatory, 
but to other people, who look at the ebb and flow of traffic almost as a natural phenomenon, it 
is not at all obviously rationale. If the demand peaks are due to a "higher order" of work and 
leisure organization it is pointless to try to change it; the main result would be a wholesale 
redistribution of income from peak travellers to off-peak travellers. 
The elasticity of demand is apparently very important – the own-price as well as the cross-
elasticities. The problem is that only some short-run elasticities are reasonably well known 
from transport operators' experiences and econometric studies of public transport demand. 
(Comprehensive surveys of transport demand elasticities are Goodwin, 1992, and Waters and 
Oum, 1992). The long-run elasticities are what we would like to have. These would tell us 
whether there is significant potential for adjustment of work starting times, times for vacation, 
leisure travel habits etc. 
4.1 Peaking problems in the time dimension 
The greatest reform potential of the pricing of SPT-services is in the differentiation of the 
fares structure by time of the day (urban commuter transport), day of the week (interurban 
transport), and season of the year. A useful rule-of-thumb roughly valid in many places is that 
interurban rail fares in off-peak (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Saturday) 
should be so low relative to the Friday and Sunday fares level that the daily demand is the 
same all week. 
It is also interesting to note that the marked weekly peak of interurban travel is reversed so far 
as intraurban travel is concerned. In big cities the vast public transport systems – bus, over- 
and underground train services – is working well below capacity during weekends. Bearing in 
mind that the interurban transport sytems are strained to the utmost in different critical hours 
during Friday and Sunday an interesting possibility is that much lower fares for intraurban 
weekend travel and higher fares for interurban travel in connection to weekends would make 
people stay more often in their hometowns, also at weekends and during holidays. 
A similar difference is to be found in the seasonal time profile between urban and interurban 
travel demand. In summertime, and particularly during the general vacation weeks, urban 
traffic – car traffic as well as public transport – is ebbing. (Relative exceptions to this rule are 
some unique tourist cities like Paris and London). Summertime is instead high tide in the non-
urban transport systems, with a possible exception for domestic airlines, where business 
travellers make up almost two thirds of the total patronage during autumn, winter and spring. 
Airlines rightly try to compensate the large drop in the travel of their main customer category, 
the business travellers, from mid-June to the end of August (in Sweden) by very substantial 
discounts off economy class fares. The Swedish Railways (SJ) fears that airlines would fill 
the empty chairs largely by former train passengers, unless SJ responds by a similar offer of 
substantial discounts off the ordinary rail fares. It should be remembered that train travel 
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demand would be at its highest during the Summer months even in the absence of fare 
discounts. The result is now that trains are overfull. This is peak-load pricing in the reverse. It 
resembles anomalies like sale in December during the Christmas rush. 
4.2 Spatial peaking problems 
The geographical peakiness of SPT demand is another reason why the optimal price structure 
is at least as important as the optimal price level. 
The cause of the spatial peaking problem is the multi-product character of SPT-services. For a 
number of good reasons a busline, or train service does not only produce transport from A to 
B, but also from B to A, and in the normal case, where one or more stops are made underway, 
between a good number of places on the route between A and B. It is very unusual that the 
structure of demand is such that the passenger flow is constant all the way from A to B. The 
normal pattern is instead that after setting out from A an accumulation of passengers on the 
bus or train occurs to begin with up to "the critical section", where the expected passenger 
flow is at a maximum. The critical section is often relatively short. Sooner or later towards the 
end of the line, it is common that the number of alighting passengers starts to exceed the 
number of boarding passengers, and the occupancy rate is falling. An example of a typical 
profile of the bus occupancy along a diametrical, urban bus line in the morning peak is given 
in fig 6 below. 
Figure 6 The number of boarding and alighting passengers, and the resultant number 
of passengers on the bus of a cross-centre service during the morning peak 
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When the bus turns around in the centre of town, or continues in the same direction on a 
diametrical course towards a neighbourhood at the opposite side of town – it makes little 
difference so far as the pattern of the rates of boarding and alighting is concerned – it will 
have a lot of excess capacity all the way to the terminus. Consequently, even in the peak 
period the average occupancy rate from start to end on a diametrical route, or on a complete 
round in the case of a radial route, is seldon much higher than about one half.  
To raise this figure by spatial peak-load pricing would be fine, if a corresponding price 
differentiation in respect of where along the line, and in which direction trips are made, could 
be practicable. One must not expect a very large effect, at least not in the short run, because 
the work-place concentration to the central city would probably not change. Neither would a 
great many people change the location of their homes as a result of spatial peak-load pricing 
of urban SPT-services, at least not in the short run. The long-run effects are, however, strictly 
unknown. 
In the following two sections two peaking problems are taken up for which demand manage-
ment by peak-load pricing would be both practicable and beneficial: the daily peaks in urban 
commuter transport, and the weekly peaks in interurban train transport. 
5. Solution to daily peaking problem – peak-load pricing of 
commuter transport by bus  
In urban transport between the suburbs and the central city, as well as between different 
suburbs, journeys to/from work is the most important travel purpose. Therefore the morning 
and afternoon peaks stand out in the time-profile of demand. In addition, the spatial peaks of 
each round voyage is just as marked. It is not only on the backhaul that the occupancy rate is 
low, but also on the main haul the bus is fully occupied only in the "critical section", which 
may constitute just a fraction of the whole route as indicated by figure 6 above. 
In OECD 1985 a model was designed by the present author with a view to determining the 
optimal differentiation of peak and off-peak fares in urban commuter transport by bus. In that 
model the question of optimal bus size was kept out of consideration. The purpose was to 
pinpoint the basic elements of peak-load pricing. Since it can be assumed that all producer 
costs are linear, the pricing-relevant marginal costs can be calculated without specifying the 
peak and off-peak demand functions. The marginal conditions for social surplus maximization 
are sufficient to obtain the optimal price structure. A summary of the model results is given 
below.
Consider a bus route between a suburb and the central city served by N buses in the peak 
period. If these buses were in operation all day, Case a, the total cost of the bus company can 
be roughly expressed like this: 
N=TC
prod
a E  (6) 
In the case where off-peak capacity is less than peak capacity, Case b, two categories of buses 
are used - "peak-only buses" and "all-day buses". As the names suggest, a peak-only bus is in 
operation only in the morning and afternoon peaks manned by a driver on a "split shift", or by 
two half-day working drivers. An all-day bus is in operation during two straight shifts. The 
total producer cost is in this case written: 
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N+N=TC po1ad
prod
b EE  (7) 
where 
 Nad  = number of all-day buses
 Npo  = number of peak-only buses 
 N = Nad + Npo = total peak vehicle requirement) 
The total time costs of the users of the bus service are also a function of N in the first place. 
The more buses there are, the higher the frequency of service with consequent reduction in 
waiting times. In Case a where the number of buses in peak and off-peak periods is the same, 
we can write the total user costs like this, denoting the total number of bus trips per day by B:
f(N)B=TC
user
a   (8) 
In Case b where the number of buses are different in peak and off-peak, the total user cost 
comes to: 
 BNf+Bf(N)=TC peak-offadpeakuserb   (9) 
We now have a complete, very simple expression for the total social cost of bus services per 
(work)day: 
f(N)B+N=TCa E  (10)  
N+N=TC po1adb EE
B)Nf(+Bf(N)+ peak-offadpeak  (11) 
5.1 The price-relevant marginal cost of peak trips 
The price-relevant cost of bus traffic should be calculated per bus in the first step. In the 
second step we arrive at a cost per bus trip simply by dividing the pricing-relevant cost per 
bus by the number of trips made on a marginal bus. 
For Case a the cost and benefit (= negative cost) of another bus in the system is easily 
obtained as: 
N
f
B+=
dN
dTCa
G
GE   (12) 
In Case b we have, in principle, two costs of additional buses, depending on whether peak 
only or all-day bus is added, although only the former alternative would be relevant when it 
comes to peak-price calculations. 
The incremental cost difference between adding an all-day bus and withdrawing a peak-only 
bus has some interest in that it represents the marginal off-peak capacity cost in Case b. If one 
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wants to increase the number of buses in off-peak, keeping the peak capacity constant, this is 
the way to go about it: add an all-day bus and take a peak-only bus out of operation, or, which 
happens in practice, of course, put a peak-only bus into all-day service. 
N
f
B+=
dN
dTC
peak1
po
b
G
GE  (13) 
N
f
B+
N
f
B+=
dN
dTC
ad
peak-offpeak
ad
b
G
G
G
GE  (14) 
-
N
f
B+-=
dN
dTC
-
dN
dTC
ad
peak-off1
poad G
GEE  (15) 
The next question is: by what should the incremental cost of an additional bus be divided to 
get the pricing-relevant cost per trip? The first thought, that the incremental cost should be 
shared by all passengers using the additional bus while it is in operation, is wrong. Only those 
passengers that are on the bus in the "critical section" of the route concerned have "cost 
responsibility" for an additional bus. This may be only something like half the total number of 
passengers travelling by the bus; for example, all passenger trips made on the back-haul put 
hardly any demand on capacity. We assume that a given proportion (D) of the total peak trips, 
Bpeak, are capacity-demanding in the sense that they occupy seats and standing space on buses 
when the buses traverse the sections of each individual route which constitute "spatial peaks". 
Dividing the incremental cost of another bus by the number of capacity-demanding peak trips 
per bus employed in the peak periods, D Bpeak/N, we get the pricing-relevant cost, MCpeak in 
two versions: 
E
B
Bf(N)
+
B
N
=MC fN
peakpeak
a
peak DD
E
 (16a) 
Ef(N)
1
+
B
N
=MC fN
peak
b
peak DD
E
  (16b) 
where 
f(N)
N
N
f
=E fN G
G
5.2 The price-relevant marginal cost of off-peak trips 
The normal off-peak case should be that buses practically never run fully occupied, and it is 
irrelevant to pursue the preceding "average cost of the marginal bus" argument. Increased off-
peak patronage should not require additional buses. 
The acts of boarding and alighting of additional passengers will reduce overall bus speed. If 
bus travel were free in off-peak, this pricing-relevant cost would be almost negligible. On the 
other hand, if a ticket were to be bought from the bus driver, the pricing-relevant cost would 
be doubled or trebled. However, it is nonsensical to charge a price with the main rationale that 
the very collection of the price, and nothing else, causes the pricing-relevant cost. Perhaps the 
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best compromise is to introduce extremely cheap monthly or yearly passes for off-peak travel. 
Passengers with passes cause hardly any additional cost (over and above the cost of a free 
rider) and a yearly pass at the cost of, say 30 Euro would not (as it should not) discourage any 
person in need of bus transport in off-peak periods, and it could have a desirable, preventive 
effect on children's or others' riding for fun or mischief. 
The case of off-peak capacity being scarce: Under certain, not very likely circumstances, it 
can be right to reduce off-peak capacity so much that the capacity constraint becomes binding 
in the critical sections also in off-peak. Or in other words, the number of all-day buses, Nad is 
made just sufficient to meet the off-peak demand in the spatial peaks on individual routes. 
In this case, Case c, the pricing-relevant cost of off-peak trips in the critical section becomes: 
B
N
dN
dTC
-
dN
dTC
=PC
peak-off
ad
poad
peak-off D
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
 
N
N
f1
+
B
N-
= ad
adpeak-off
ad1
G
G
DD
EE    (17) 
Figure 7 The bus inputs during the day in three cases
It is interesting to note that it matters very little for the pricing-relevant cost whether or not 
off-peak capacity can be assumed to be a binding constraint. The pricing-relevant cost is very 
low all the same. This is a reflection of the fact that the benefit to all off-peak passengers of 
increasing the frequency of service is so relatively great (when the frequency is at a low level 
initially) that the incremental cost of another peak-only bus extending its operation to all-day 
service is almost offset by cost savings for the original off-peak passengers. 
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5.3 Numerical example of the optimal structure of bus fares 
On the assumption that the average waiting time at stops is equal to half the headway time, 
and with the parameter values used in the previous Circletown model, the level and structure 
of optimal fares can be calculated: the results are summarized in table 3.  
As seen, peak fares in the critical section should be more than twice the producer average 
cost, but still at a moderate level in absolute terms. Fares for trips outside the critical section, 
and off-peak fares generally, should be very low, which indicates that a substantial subsidy is 
required. It can be observed that it turns out that for peak trips the level of the pricing-relevant 
cost is substantially higher in Case a than in Case b in the numerical example. This is not a 
general characteristic of running only all-day buses versus differentiating the peak and off-
peak frequency of service, but a result of the fact that the bus size is held cosntant in all 
calculations. However, in the given circumstances of the model example the same bus size 
cannot be optimal in both alternatives.  
Table 3 Examples of price-relevant marginal costs and bus company average costs 
per trip in peak and off-peak, excluding night, Saturday and Sunday services  
Price-relevant costs in peak periods  Euro per trip
Trips in critical section, Case a   3.30 
Trips in critical section, Case b and c   2.40 
Other trips, Case a, b, and c   0.20 
Price-relevant costs in off-peak periods  Euro per trip
Trips in critical section, Case a and b   0.08 
Trips in critical section, Case c   0.10 
Other trips Case a, b, and c   0.08 
The bus company cost per trip, AC
prod
 Euro per trip
All trips, Case a   1.12 
All trips, Case b   1.04 
All trips, Case c   0.94 
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6. Solution to weekly peaking problem – peak-load pricing of 
interurban train services 
The peak-load pricing problem is now weekly rather than daily, when it comes to interurban 
transport. The peaks and troughs in the daily demand time-profile can, at least partly, be met 
by varying the length of trains at different departure times without increasing the slack. 
During off-peak days, on the other hand, the excess capacity of the rolling stock, which will 
arise if uniform pricing over time is applied, cannot be gainfully used elsewhere, because the 
weekly time-profile is by and large the same for all lines. In Jansson, et.al 1992 a model of 
railway transport was prepared for deriving the price-relevant marginal cost of passenger train 
services, which has been further developed in the ongoing UNITE project by a case study of a 
particular line. The main results of this work are summarized below. 
In long-distance public transport, where time-tables are used by prospective riders, the 
"Mohring effect" is more difficult to estimate compared to the case of urban travel. Therefore, 
the right approach for long-distance train transport is to calculate the price-relevant marginal 
cost by assuming that additional passenger demand is met by vehicle size increases. 
6.1 The price-relevant cost of passenger train services 
This idea is relatively simple to apply in the case of flexible-formation train transport, where 
train size (length) is adjustable; carriages can be added to or uncoupled from the train in a 
marshalling yard during night. Boarding/alighting charges is moreover a very mild 
complication because unlike in bus transport the number of inlets and outlets is increasing 
proportionally to vehicle size, and tickets are bought in advance, which means that ticket 
transaction time is no part of the transport vehicle time. 
The only more demanding bit in the calculation of the incremental cost of adding another 
carriage to a train is to find out how energy cost develops as a train is made successively 
longer. In a joint study with SJ it was found that, given train speed, energy consumption will 
increase linearly with train length in the whole range of observations. Then the price-relevant 
cost can be formulated in a very simple way. The least unit of supply is another carriage 
carried from the point of departure, say the central station of Stockholm, to the final 
destination, for example Malmö, and back again. The incremental cost of producing this 
additional capacity constitutes the numerator of the pricing-relevant cost, and the number of 
additional passengers thus accommodated constitutes the denominator: 
MC
train
ti =
n
cD+
tiP                                                       (18) 
      
= pricing-relevant  marginal cost per occupied seat day t train departure i  
   (t = 1........365, and i = 1......m) 
P ti        = opportunity cost day t train departure i of  the marginal carriage 
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c  = additional running cost of a train per kilometer caused by coupling up another           
                 carriage 
D           =  round voyage distance 
n        =  target number of occupied seats per carriage 
This formulation of the price-relevant marginal cost presupposes that the train on the route 
concerned only makes one round voyage per day. On a shorter route it may be possible to 
carry out one and a half, or more two rounds, which would mean that the denominator is to be  
increased by a factor of 1.5, 2, etc. 
Note that the price-relevant cost is given per occupied seat of a round voyage. This cost 
should be shared out among all passengers successively occupying a particular seat during a 
round voyage. The number of passengers per seat and round voyage could be two, one in each 
direction, or more than two, since many passengers make shorter trips than the whole distance 
from start to end. 
An efficiency condition is that summed over all departures all days of a year the opportunity 
cost of a carriage should equal the annual capital cost. 
The financial result of optimal pricing of passenger train services is easily imagined. The 
revenue will cover the capital and operating costs of carriages including guards' wage costs, 
but no contribution will be made towards covering the costs of engines including engine-
drivers' wage costs, nor to the major part of overhead costs which are independent of train 
length. Only about half the total costs of passenger services will be covered by optimal train 
fares.
6.2 The optimal structure of train fares 
An additional efficiency conditions, which is useful in the derivation of the peak-load pricing 
structure, can be written like this: 
Pt1 = Pt2 = ... Pti ... = Ptm = Pt                                                              (19) 
The rolling stock of a particular line can be assumed as given one particular day. The number 
of engines and carriages can only be changed from one day to another. An efficiency 
condition is then that each day the given number of carriages should be distributed between 
the m trains such that the capacity utilization is nearly constant. This means in turn that the 
opportunity cost of a carriage is the same every departure a particular day, as shown in (18) 
above. 
The stochastic element in railway travel demand is substantial, so a very high occupancy rate 
should not be aimed at. At present for SJ the mean occupancy rate of SJs trains is about 1/3, 
but is systematically rather different in different sub-markets. By eliminating the systematic 
differences by means of peak-load pricing, aiming basically at equalization of the train 
occupancy rate in time and space, it should be possible to raise the mean occupancy rate to at 
least 1/2, which would be a very considerable improvement. 
The first demand equalization to aim at should be to make the Monday-Thursday and 
Saturday (off-peak) level of demand nearly equal to the Friday and Sunday (peak) level. A 
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representative example of the time profile of train travel demand by day of the week in 
Sweden is given in figure 18. 
Figure 7 Rail travel between Stockholm and Gävle on the different days of the week
It was found in Jansson et.al 1992 that Pi = 0 in off-peak, i.e. if fares in off-peak were based 
on just the running cost component cD of the pricing-relevant cost (see equation (4) above), 
the level of demand would just fall short of the peak level as it would be when peak traffic 
alone pays the carriage capital costs. 
The second demand equalization to aim at should be to level out spatial peaks and troughs. 
We have not gone into this matter very deeply. A lot remains to be done. Take just as a rather 
typical example the line between Stockholm and Sundsvall in the north of Sweden. Dividing 
it into three sections, the daily passenger flow in peak and off-peak, respectively, in the three 
sections was as follows: 
Table 4  Passenger flow per day in three sections in peak and off-peak relative to the 
critical section of the Stockholm-Sundsvall line  
Line segment  Fri, Sun  Mon-Thur, Sat
Stockholm - Gävle 
Gävle – Söderhamn 
Söderhamn - Sundsvall 
100
75
45
53
37
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The peak/off-peak price differentiation advocated above would equalize the flow figures in 
each particular row in table 4. To make spatial supply and demand match better, the first step 
is to make some trains from Stockholm turn around already in Gävle, and some in 
Söderhamn. The spatial demand equalization would then imply a price differentiation to the 
end of making the occupancy rate equal in each section of the line. 
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6.3 Numerical example of three different lines 
In the numerical example below of optimal fares according to the principles of peak-load 
pricing, the focus is on the fare differentiation by day of the week. Fares examples are given 
for a rather short, a medium-distance, and a fairly long-distance line. Never mind the absolute 
values of the figures; they are in Swedish currency in the year 1990. It is the structure of fares, 
which is interesting. As seen in table 5, both with and without a budget constraint, off-peak 
fares should be only about one third of the peak fares. Since the elasticity of demand for rail 
travel differs somewhat between routes with and without airline competition, both cases are 
considered in the illustration.
Table 5  Optimal rail fares for different days of the week on three different lines in  
  1990, SEK per  second class single trip from start to end 
Line dis-
tance 
Day of the 
week
Optimal fares 
  without budget 
constraint 
with budget con-
straint 
  Air 
comp
No air 
comp
Air 
comp
No air 
comp
170 km Fri, Sun 
Mon-Thu, 
Sat
113
 30 
113
 30 
154
 56 
154
 57 
335 km Fri, Sun 
Mon-Thu, 
Sat
187
 50 
202
 58 
240
 87 
303
123
550 km Fri, Sun 
Mon-Thu, 
Sat
254
 72 
294
 96 
292
104
462
204
As seen, the route distance makes little difference so far as the peak/off-peak differentiation is 
concerned. Naturally where air transport is an alternative, fares are more markedly tapering 
off with respect to distance. 
The low off-peak fares in the optimal tariff would apply to 70 % of total travel. This means 
that the weighted average fare level is substantially lower than the level of SJ's fares at that 
time. In case the financial result is constrained to be the same as that of SJ, we found that also 
the level of second-best (Ramsey) fares is lower than SJ’s fares, which were not differentiated 
between peak and off-peak days.  
We made a rough calculation of the likely travel volume increase as a result of changing over 
to the optimal fares structure. In the unconstrained case the travel volume would double. Most 
of the increase would, of course, occur in the off-peak period. In the constrained case the price 
level has to be substantially higher, and as a consequence, the increase in the total volume of 
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travel is down to 40%. It is interesting to note that the net welfare gain in the latter case is as 
high as 75% of the net welfare gain of peak-load pricing in the case where no budget 
constraint is assumed. 
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7. Refutation of the main objections to public transport 
subsidization I: “The cost of public funds” 
In urban bus transport, in particular, it seems that  less than half the revenue should come 
from fares in order to meet the marginal conditions for social surplus maximization. And in 
addition, as long as urban road pricing is missing (apart from general fuel taxation), second-
best optimal prices of urban public transport should be still lower (Larsen, 1997). 
The latter reason for urban public transport subsidization seems together with welfare 
distributional considerations to be the main, or only, rationale in the minds of politicians and 
decision-makers for the present large subsidization of urban public transport (which in many 
towns and cities happens to be of the right order of magnitude from a social-economic point 
of view). If proper road pricing would at last be introduced, it is consequently likely that 
many influential persons would argue for abandoning the subsidization of public transport. 
A more sofisticated argument to the same effect is that the so called “cost of public funds”  
may justify the discontinuation of public transport subsidization in case road pricing is 
introduced. This issue is the main topic of the following discussion. There is also another 
main objection to public transport subsidization: “Cost efficiency”, i.e. carrying out a given 
task at the least cost, may suffer in a subsidization regime, which could easily outweigh the 
allocative gain obtained by optimal pricing. I take the stand that both cost efficiency, or “X-
efficiency” (Leibenstein, 1966) and allocative efficiency are to be aimed at, and the crux of 
the matter is to design the institutional framework such that the potential goal conflict is 
eliminated. This is a new research area, which is just touched upon in this paper. 
7.1 The excess burden of different taxes including prices exceeding the 
marginal costs 
The ideal state of affairs is obtained when the prices are equal to the price-relevant marginal 
costs everywhere in the economy, and public undertakings, including subsidies to decreasing-
cost industries, are financed by the surplus from increasing-cost industries, the revenue from 
externality charges (unless it is earmarked to compensating the sufferers), and individual poll 
taxes. By differentiating the poll taxes in accordance with the widely different ability to pay 
of different individuals, e.g. in such a way that everybody pays the same total tax next year as 
he/she actually did last year, but now (in the first-best situation) in the form of a lump-sum tax 
which is independent of next year’s income, ambitious distributional goals can also be 
obtained. 
The point of lump-sum taxes is that there is no excess burden involved. So in reality, when 
funds are raised by income and/or commodity taxation there is a “cost of public funds” (CPF) 
involved. This is a seemingly convenient concept which has recently been introduced in 
practical cost-benefit analysis. Empirically it is measured as the weighted average of the 
excess burden, or deadweight loss per crown of tax revenue raised by each particular tax. An 
efficiency condition, taking only allocative efficiency into account, is that the marginal cost of 
public funds is equal for each tax. A brief survey of the causes of the excess burden of four 
different types of taxes follows below. A literature survey of the empirical work with a view 
to estimating the marginal cost of public funds is given in Brendemoen 1999. 
(1) A specific commodity tax upsetting the optimality conditions of a first-best economy 
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imposes an “excess burden” on the economy (over and above the burden on the tax-payers), 
which can be measured in a diagrammatic, partial analysis of the commodity market 
concerned by the triangle representing the difference between the consumers’ surplus lost and 
the tax revenue obtained. It should be observed that a price set above the price-relevant cost, 
for example for public transport services, imposes a corresponding excess burden on the 
economy. 
The measurement of the excess burden should be based on the compensated  demand curve, 
i.e. the demand as it would appear in case consumers were compensated by income rises, as 
the commodity tax is successively raised, to keep them at the same level of utility. When it 
comes to a specific tax imposed on just one commodity, constituting a small fraction of total 
consumption, the income effect is small enough to be ignored for practical purposes (Willig 
1976), and the more easily observable uncompensated demand curve could be used as a good 
approximation when calculating the excess burden of a specific commodity tax. 
The table below illustrates the relative order of magnitude of the excess burden of a specific 
commodity tax under the simplifying assumptions of a constant marginal cost of production, 
and a linear demand function in the relevant range. In this case the excess burden relative to 
the tax revenue obtained is determined by just the proportional difference between the 
resulting output volume (after the tax is imposed) and the first-best output volume, 
irrespective of the elasticity of demand. If the ratio of second-best to first-best output is X, the 
excess burden (EB) relative to the tax revenue (TR) raised is equal to X/2(1-X). This ratio 
defines the “average excess burden”, and dEB/dTR the “marginal excess burden”. When TR 
reaches its maximum, the marginal excess burden goes to infinity, while the average excess 
burden in the illustrative example of table 1 is just one half, i.e. half a crown per crown of tax 
revenue. 
Table 6: The average and marginal excess burden of a specific commodity tax
Percentage reduction 
of first-best output 
volume 
Average excess 
burden, EB/TR 
Marginal excess 
burden, dEB/dTR 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
.
.
100% 
0.06 
0.13 
0.21 
0.33 
0.50 
f
0.13 
0.33 
0.75 
2.00 
f
-1
A given percentage reduction of the first-best output volume can be the result of rather 
different tax levels when the elasticity of demand takes different values. The stronger 
substitutes of the taxed commodity there are, and, consequently, the more elastic the demand 
is, the greater the effect of a given tax on the quantity demanded will be. The root cause of the 
excess burden of a specific tax on, for example, oranges is thus that the choice of fruit is 
distorted.
(2) A general commodity tax, e.g. a uniform value-added tax (vat), imposes an excess 
burden on the economy which has a different primary cause. The resource allocation between 
commodities is not the main problem since all prices are raised equi-proportionelly, but the 
choice between work and leisure. 
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In the hypothetical case where the total vat revenue is paid back to the households as given 
lump-sums, a reduction in the quantity demanded of  all different commodities will occur 
only if the total amount of work is reduced. On a free labour market this is likely to happen. 
The real wage is reduced to the tune of the increase in the price  level due to the vat, and as 
the income effect on the choice between work and leisure is eliminated by a hypothetical 
refund, only the substitution effect on labour supply is operative. The substitution effect is 
always positive – lower real wages lead to a reduction of the supply of labour when looking at 
the compensated labour supply curve. Therefore the main excess burden of a uniform vat is to 
be found in the labour market. We shall come to this later when the excess burden of income 
taxation is discussed at the end of this section. Let us first deal with “Ramsey taxes”, since the 
contribution of Ramsey (1927) has played a main role in the public economics literature since 
it was “rediscovered” by Baumol and Bradford (1970). 
(3) By differentiated commodity taxation it is possible to do better than by a flat vat rate, it 
can be argued. The first-best position cannot be reached, because by taxing consumption, 
however sophisticated it is done, the optimal balance between work time and leisure time is 
upset. The only “solution” to this problem would be to tax leisure time by the same rate as 
work time, and in this imaginary case no commodity tax differentiation is called for. Such 
taxation would be equivalent to a poll tax, because when all 24 hours of a day are taxed by the 
same rate per hour, the total tax is obviously a given lump-sum. 
Ramsey (1927) considered the problem of second-best commodity taxation, on the condition 
that leisure time could not be taxed, and assuming homogeneous consumers. (The term 
“second-best” was, to be sure, not yet invented at that time). Ramsey found that the tax rates 
of different commodities should be inversely proportional to the absolute value of the demand 
elasticites, or with an alternative formulation  that the resulting percentage deviation between 
the first-best and the actual output should be the same for all commodities.  
To bring proportional demand quantity curtailment about by commodity taxation, tax rates 
which are disproportional to the marginal cost of production are required, because the 
demands for commodities which are complements to leisure decrease less than the demands 
for commodities which are substitutes to leisure. Hence the Ramsey Rule implies that 
complements to leisure should be relatively heavily, and substitutes relatively mildly taxed. 
When the assumption of homogeneous consumers are relaxed, everything gets much more 
complicated, which will be discussed in a following section. At this stage it can be concluded  
that the easing-off of the excess burden of a uniform vat that could be obtained by Ramsey 
taxes, given the total tax revenue required, is likely to be relatively insignificant in a 
hypothetical economy of homogeneous consumers (compare Stiglitz, 1988). A greater 
problem is probably the excess burden in the labour market, which is not directly addressed 
by the original theory of optimal commodity taxation. 
(4) A proportional income tax has an equivalent effect on the choice between work and 
leisure as a uniform vat. Income taxation is by far the most important source of income for 
central, and, in particular, local governments (in Sweden among other countries), so in reality 
the main excess burden of taxation is for double reasons connected to the labour supply 
function. This is also well certified by the empirical studies of the “cost of public funds”. Let 
us look a little closer at this function:  
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 SL = supply of labour 
 W = wage cost for employers 
 t = all-inclusive tax rate on labour 
 P  =   MC (1+c) = price level, where 
                            MC = level of marginal cost of production 
             c = average commodity tax rate 
 LST = lump-sum tax (including negative taxes like state pensions) 
 GCcom = generalized cost of home-work commuting 
In the public economics literature it is common – and theoretically adequate in my view – to 
call every excess of the final price over the marginal cost a ”tax”, no matter whether it is a 
governmental tax, or just the result of profit-maximizing under imperfect competition, or full-
cost price-making. In expression (20) above c stand for the average tax rate of commodities in 
this wider sense. 
The explanatory variables included in (20) are not the only arguments, but supposedly the 
most important ones of the labour supply function. The first-mentioned argument, the real 
wage rate has both a substitution and an income effect on the choice between work and 
leisure. The excess burden should be calculated with reference to the compensated labour 
supply function. Although the “ordinary” uncompensated supply function could very well be 
completely inelastic, or even backward-bending, it is axiomatic that the compensated labour 
supply function is positively related to the real wage rate, and consequently that there is an 
excess burden of taxes on labour, irrespective of the actual shape of the uncompensated 
supply function. Stiglitz (1988) gives the following exceedingly simple formula for the excess 
burden (EB) relative to the tax revenue (TR) obtained by a proportional income tax rate, t:
In this formula e stands for the compensated labour supply elasticity. Unfortunately, e is very 
difficult to estimate. Different approaches to estimating the compensated labour supply 
elasticity have yielded a wide range of values – from negative values, which are inconsistent 
with basic theory, to values close to unity,  which also are implausible. In the Handbook of 
Labour Economics edited by Ashenfelter and Layard, the results of a number of major 
)20(,...GCLST,,
c)MC(1
t)W(1
fS comL ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§

 
ratewagereal
P
t)W(1
w   
(21)e
2
t
TR
EB  
30
empirical studies are summarized, and it is concluded that “if labour economists had to vote 
on the best elasticity, the average might be 0.11” (Pencavel, 1986, chapter 1). 
Using this figure and the fact that about two thirds of labour cost are taxes gives a relative 
excess burden of the Swedish tax system of approximately 0.025, which does not seem very 
high. The marginal cost of public funds is, however, higher – at least twice as high. However, 
the value of e is the critical parameter. A rather low value for men is plausible, but a 
considerably higher value seems to apply to the female labour supply. 
7.2 Implications for cost-benefit analysis and pricing policy in transport 
So far we have followed the traditional way of discussing the excess burden of taxation by 
keeping the question of what the taxes are to be used for out of the discussion. It is now time 
to bring this matter into the picture. 
The government needs tax money for a number of reasons: three main purposes can be 
distinguished in this connection: 
(1)  To buy resources for the production of public goods (which are services in reality, i.e. 
"immaterial goods") as well as services, which do not have the character of ”public 
goods”, like medical care and schooling, but which are provided free, or highly 
subsidized.
(2)  To transfer money in the form of various allowances to the needy. 
(3)  To pay subsidies to decreasing-cost industries to make marginal cost pricing feasible.  
The third purpose is not very prominent in general discussions of public finance, but, of 
course, relevant for the question of optimal transport pricing.  
The point is that the net excess burden imposed on the economy by tax-financing different 
public undertakings depends on the character of the undertaking in question. Bringing home 
this point, the three, aforementioned main purposes of taxation are taken up in turn: 
7.2.1   The cost of public funds for the purpose of public production 
A relatively clearcut case is the tax-financing of pure public goods like national defence, 
and the administration of justice. For these undertakings there are no offsetting effect on 
labour supply to set against the excess burden of the required taxation. Pure public goods are 
characterized by non-rivalry and non-excludability, which means that everybody are “free 
riders”. The appearance of  more and/or better public goods on the market gives no extra 
incentive to work, because the goods are available for free. 
What about investments in transport infrastructure? Cost-benefit manuals issued by national 
road and rail administrations prescribe that “the marginal cost of public funds” should be 
taken into account so far as tax-financed road and railway investments are concerned. In 
Sweden the current figure is 0.3 crowns per tax-crown. There are no tollroads in Sweden. It is 
sometimes argued, however, that if some new roads were instead financed by tolls, the 
investment costs should not be inflated by the factor 1.3 Is this very logical? When a free road 
becomes a toll-road the real wage rate expression in the labour supply function (1) above is 
affected downwards by a denominator increase. In the absence of money illusions this would 
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create an excess burden comparable to a rise of the income tax rate, t in the numerator. In the 
next step, however, it should be observed that road users will normally get something in 
return for the tolls paid; they save time, and the accident risk may be reduced. The price level 
index P should not go up, if an increase in a constituent price is set off by a quality rise, which 
the consumers value at least as much. 
A variation of the latter argument can be applied to the main case of free-road investments: 
the quality of the road services goes up (the generalized cost goes down) at least to the tune of 
the tax money requirement for bringing it about. The fuel tax can be regarded as the price of 
the road services of a “free-road” network. As long as the nominal value of the fuel tax stays 
the same, and the quality of road services is improved, the real price of road services  is 
falling. This should be taken into account when considering the excess burden of the tax 
money used for state grants to investments in transport infrastructure. The practice of inflating 
the investment costs by a factor reflecting the “marginal cost of public funds” seems doubtful 
in this case. 
7.2.2  The cost of public funds for the purpose of transfer payments to households 
Income transfer from the more wealthy to the less wealthy affects two main arguments in 
the labour supply function (20) – the real wage rate, w, and LST.
The former effect gives rise to an excess burden because the real wage rate is decreased. The 
negative influence on labour supply by the substitution effect of the real wage decrease is 
reinforced by the latter effect, i.e. the income effect of the lump-sum payments to the needy, 
which are financed by tax rises. 
7.2.3 The cost of public funds for the purpose of subsidizing decreasing-cost industries 
Taxation with a view to financing subsidies to decreasing-cost industries has also two 
effects on the labour supply function: if the income tax rate, t is increased, the numerator of 
the real wage expression in (20) goes down, but so does the denominator of (20) when the 
price of decreasing-cost industries is lowered down to the marginal cost. As a first 
approximation it can be assumed that such a restructuring of taxes will have no influence at 
all on labour supply. If some taxes are raised to finance cuts in other taxes, the real after-tax 
wage rate will stay the same, and no excess burden will arise. On the other hand, in the case 
of public transport (as well as road services), it is seen that a possible positive effect on the 
labour supply may come up from the third argument in (20), GCcom. There is a lot of 
discussion of the  secondary effects on employment, and economic growth in general, of 
reductions in the generalized cost of  transport, which we shall not go into here. This would 
lead too far away from the main line of the present argument. Let it only be said that the 
possibility that a reduction of GCcom can increase employment reinforces the main conclusion 
that the taxation necessary to finance a marginal cost pricing policy of local public transport 
does not result in an excess burden on the economy. 
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8. Refutation of the main objections to public transport 
subsidization II: towards achievement of both allocative- 
and X-efficiency in public transport 
The second part of the heading above is the title of a forthcoming article by Johansen et.al 
(2001), where the basic idea is to design the subsidization system for public transport 
companies such that profit maximization on the part of the SPT-operator will coincide with 
social surplus maximization. “Performance contracts” towards this end have in fact already 
been introduced in some cases in Norway. It would lead too far here, to go into this intriguing 
issue in depth. Let us only call attention to a promising area for new research, and by some 
further comments clarify what the basic idea boils down to. 
Profit maximization is “producer surplus” (PS) maximization. What is most desirable from a 
social point of view is that the “social surplus” (SS) is maximized. The difference between 
these two surpluses is, of course, the consumers’ surplus (CS). 
 SS = PS + CS 
Transport-system-externalities like exhaust fumes from buses can be assumed to be 
internalized by appropriate externality charges, and need not be further elaborated. However, 
the basic idea of solving the apparent conflict between the operator’s desire to maximize his 
profit, and social surplus maximization, is related to externality internalization: every change 
in CS that is a result of whatever step is taken by the operator should ideally be internalised in 
his profit and loss account. Given that a public transport system is a pronounced decreasing-
cost activity, social surplus maximization would create a large financial loss, and is therefore 
out of the question for the operator. On the other hand, in case every positive change in CS 
would increase his revenue and every negative change in CS would reduce his revenue 
correspondingly, the operator would have the necessary incentive to act as a SS-maximizer. 
How should this incentive be provided in practice? The most interesting idea is that the price 
and/or supply regulations can be abolished, which typically are parts of the deal between the 
principal and the operator, if the subsidization “formula” could take the form of CS 
internalization. Then the operator has the freedom and right incentive to take steps in pricing 
policy, service design, manning, etc. which would enhance both cost-efficiency, and 
allocative efficiency. 
The challenge is, obviously, to find “the formula”, which would work in practice, that is to 
say, is sufficiently reliable, as well as intelligible for both regulator and operator. 
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